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LOOKING BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES:
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL NORMS INTO THE
SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE
JOSH HSU*
During the 2004 Presidential Election, Democratic-nominee John Kerry criticized
President Bush for not engaging in an international dialogue for the Iraqi War and
the War on Terrorism.' The rationale behind this criticism was two-fold. First,
involving other nations in the discussion would show that we respected their ideas
and that we were willing to listen to their thoughts on how to best address the two
global conflicts. Second, showing this respect to other nations would be beneficial
toward obtaining their cooperation in resolving the Iraqi conflict and international
terrorism.'
The push for an international dialogue was a serious campaign issue as it divided
our nation into two factions-one argued that international diplomacy was the most
effective means of solving the War with Iraq and the War on Terrorism, and the
other claimed that such a dialogue was an unnecessary hurdle toward achieving the
most important objective of all-the safety of the American people.3 There were
those who straddled the line on this issue, but it would be an understatement to say
that the issue was not polarizing.
This debate, which involved the executive branch, has a parallel in the judicial
branch. There, however, the issue is whether the Supreme Court should involve
itself in an international dialogue when resolving its own cases. This dispute has
risen to the forefront lately, along with the push for more international diplomacy
on the executive front.4 Whether this is a result of globalization or a mere
coincidence, one cannot deny that an international presence has lodged itself as an
integral part of our political discourse. While the recent presidential election
provided airtime to the executive's prerogative to engage in an international
dialogue, this Article seeks to take a more expansive look at a similar issue from the
perspective of the Judiciary, where the factions that have formed are just as divided.

* O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. A.B. 2002; J.D., 2005, Georgetown. I would like to extend
my sincerest thanks to Professor Richard Lazarus for his insightful comments on my initial draft. In addition, I am
also indebted to Robin Leone for her edits and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Bryan Bender, NATO Agrees to Send Advisers to Iraq: Will Train Local Security Forces,B.
GLOBE, Oct. 14,2004, at Al; Mark Matthews, Winner's Most CriticalRole May Be That of War Leader, BALT.
SuN, Oct. 3, 2004, at IF; Richard W. Stevenson & Jim Rutenberg, The President:Citing Success in Policy, Bush
Re-enters Fray, N.Y. TMES, July 31, 2004, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Brian Knowlton, Kerry Embarks on New Attack on Iraq: He Says Bush Treated Potential
Oct. 21, 2004, at 4; Howard LaFranchi, At Odds: Very Different Worldviews,
Allies Badly, INT'L HERALD TRmIB.,

CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 20, 2004, at 1.
3. LaFranchi, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, High CourtJustices Hold Rare PublicDebate, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2005,
at 3A; Anne E. Kornblut, Justice UrgesU.S. Courtsto ConsiderForeignLaws, INT'LHERALD TRIB., Apr. 4, 2005,
at 8; Sean D. Murphy, The Law of the Lands: Why U.S. Courts Look Overseas, B. GLOBE, June 5,2005, at D12.
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Aside from a few cases involving the death penalty,5 the Supreme Court's use of
international legal norms in its constitutional jurisprudence has been relatively
sparse. Before the 2001 Supreme Court Term, the last time the Court referenced
international authority was in Thompson v. Oklahoma,6 a 1988 juvenile death
penalty case. Just a year later, the Court appeared to have laid this practice to rest
as it explicitly rejected the use of international authority in Stanford v. Kentucky,7
another juvenile death penalty case.8 Thus, it came as quite a surprise for courtwatchers when the Court decided to revive this practice in Atkins v. Virginia,9 a
decision that was issued at the conclusion of the 2001 Term, in which Justice
Stevens noted the international community's opposition to executing criminals with
mental retardation. 0 While some pundits argued that the use of international norms
in Atkins did not signal a more widespread trend of citing foreign law," others felt
that Atkins placed more emphasis on international authority than previous death
penalty cases. 2
Both sides of the issue, however, were forced to recognize the possibility of an
increased role for international authority in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 3
when Justice Kennedy penned Lawrence v. Texas'4 the following Term. In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy relied on a case from the European Court of Human
Rights as persuasive authority in his interpretation of the Due Process Clause's right
to privacy. 15 This extension of international authority to a case wholly unrelated to
the death penalty hinted 6at the potential for the application of foreign sources to a
1
whole new area of law.
And finally, in May of 2005, the Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, 7
where it held that the death penalty was unconstitutional when applied to juveniles
who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed their capital crime.18
Roper, which picked up where Atkins left off, asserted in a separate section the

5. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (holding that executing ajuvenile under the
age of sixteen would offend civilized standards of decency, which is "consistent with the views [of]... other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by leading members of the Western European community"); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (noting that "'the climate of international opinion concerning
acceptability of a particular punishment' is an additional consideration which is 'not irrelevant"' (quoting Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977))).
6. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
7. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
8. Id. at 369 n. 1 ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting
the contention of petitioners and their various amici... that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant.").
9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
10. Id.at316n.21.
11. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223,248 n. 131 (2003) (stating that the citation to international opinion in Atkins was relegated
to a mere footnote and that many of the justices were unwilling to permit jurisprudence from foreign nations to
affect U.S. laws).
12. See Natasha Fain, Note, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 607, 628 (2003).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See, e.g., Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 573.
See infra Part I.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 572.
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views of other nations in assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty as
applied to juveniles.'9 Importantly, Justice Kennedy's decision to devote a separate
section of the opinion to those views perhaps eradicated any doubts that Atkins and
Lawrence were isolated instances of referencing international sources of authority.
Although these three decisions alone do not signify that the Court has
incorporated the use of international norms into its adjudicative process, this Article
argues here that there are significant benefits to such a practice. In spite of intense
20
criticism accusing the Court of abusing its power and exceeding its authority, it
is this Article's contention that in referencing international authority the Court is
taking a logical step in the face of globalization. The use of international norms can
provide the Court with, among other things, a different perspective, 2' unique
insight,22 and legitimacy in the eyes of the world community.23 These benefits may
all result from a simple act of reciprocity whereby the preeminent court in the
American judiciary demonstrates its willingness to participate in an international
dialogue about the law.
As of the writing of this Article, the majority of the Justices sitting on the U.S.
Supreme Court appear to be open to the possibility of using international norms in
the Court's adjudicative process. Based on past opinions, as well as on articles
written about the Justices' public engagements, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Kennedy all seem to favor this practice,24 while only Justices Scalia
and Thomas openly oppose it. 25 At a recent event honoring Justice O'Connor, she
expressed views characteristic of the majority in espousing this trend: "I suspect
that over time we will rely increasingly, or take notice at least increasingly, on
international and foreign courts in examining domestic issues. '26 And, that doing
so "may not only enrich our own country's decisions," but may also "create that all
important good impression. 27

19. Id. at 574-78.

20. See Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: A Symposium, COMMENTARY, Oct. 2003, at 25
[hereinafter Symposium].
21. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. See Sanford Levinson, in Symposium, supra note 20, at 37, 39.
23. See Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a
Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417,421 (2000).

24. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (opinion by Kennedy, J., with Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
& Stevens, J.J., joining); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (opinion by Stevens, J., with Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, Kennedy & O'Connor, J.J., joining); see also Bill Rankin, U.S. Justice Is Honored: O'Connor Says Court
Has Its Ear to the World, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 29, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6244147 (quoting Justice
O'Connor stating that the Court will increasingly rely on international norms).
25. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (writing that "[the Court's discussion of these
foreign views.. is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court.. .should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."' (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990,990 n. (2002) (Thomas,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari))); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stressing that
he wrote separately "to call attention to the defects in the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws"). But
see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying in part on
the experience of "foreign democracies" for upholding a ban on anonymous pamphleteering as they have had
success "protecting and enhancing democratic elections"); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,718 n. 16,734
(1997) (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting the Netherlands' experience with physician-assisted suicides and the

rejection of euthanasia in several other countries).
26. Rankin, supra note 24.

27. Id. Although Justice O'Connor recently retired, her opinions were a fair representation of the views of
the majority, and she continues to be respected by members of the Court.
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Even though a majority of the Justices seem to support the use of international
norms as persuasive authority," numerous critics have voiced their opposition to
this practice. There are those like Justice Scalia and Judge Bork who argue that the
Court's adoption of international authority violates principles of separation of
powers because the unelected, activist judiciary has imposed the laws and norms of
other nations onto our citizenry-in spite of the fact that those norms have not been
enacted through the democratic process. 29 This practice has also been attacked from
the standpoint that the use of international norms raises federalism concerns
because these norms are being used by the Supreme Court to invalidate state laws
that have been passed democratically via state legislatures. 30 Thus, the argument
goes, when the Court relies on foreign authority, it is allowing a non-relevant source
of law to serve as the outcome-determinative factor in assessing the constitutionality
of that state law.3' This seems to strike at the very heart of the federalism doctrine,
which prohibits the federal government from arbitrarily infringing on a state's
generalized police powers.32 Lastly, the practice of using international norms is also
subject to criticism in its very application by the Supreme Court. The most common
critique is that the Court does not have any checks to confine its use of foreign
authority. 33 It could very well decide to apply international norms as binding
authority or arbitrarily select a foreign norm to support the outcome of its case.
Because international norms are not systematically organized, in terms of
precedential value or persuasiveness, this practice is vulnerable to large-scale
abuse.34
The majority of the criticisms fall into one of the three areas described above:
separation of powers, federalism, and arbitrary application of international legal
norms. This Article seeks to explore and refute these concerns, using Atkins,
Lawrence, and Roper as a contextual basis.
To summarize briefly, the Article will be organized as follows: Part I will
provide some additional background on Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper and will also
assess their historical significance. Part II will present more fully the three
foundational arguments and will rebut them accordingly. Finally, Part III will

28. The changes that will occur with the new Roberts Court may be narrowing this majority rapidly. First,
Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern over the use of international norms in the Court's decisions during his
confirmation hearings. See James G. Lakely, Roberts CriticizesForeign Law Used as Precedent, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2005, at A11. Second, Justice O'Connor's retirement was conditioned upon the confirmation of her
successor. Justice O'Connor was an ardent proponent of citing international norms, and it is possible that newly
appointed Justice Alito will not be as amenable as Justice O'Connor was to that practice.
29.

See ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 16 (2003) (maintaining

that those who cannot achieve their political goals through the legislative process turn to the courts and push for
the adoption of international norms); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court should not "'impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.' (quoting Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari))).
30. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's decision to place
weight on foreign laws "is antithetical to considerations of federalism").
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Eric D. Hargan, The Sovereignty Implications of Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions (The
Federalist Soc'y for Law and Pub. Policy Studies), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Intllaw&%20AmerSov/
hargensov.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
34. See id.
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expound on the true benefits of taking part in this international dialogue by delving
into the arguments about the additional perspective provided by international
authority, as well as its potential to ensure the Court of its international legitimacy.
I. ATKINS, ROPER, AND LAWRENCE: THE PIONEERS
37
Atkins v. Virginia,35 Lawrence v. Texas,36 and Roper v. Simmons are the most
recent Supreme Court decisions in which the Justices used international norms as
a source of authority in support of their holdings. 38 The importance of Atkins lies
39
primarily in its restoration of citing foreign norms after Stanford v. Kentucky
explicitly rejected this practice in 1989.' Justice Scalia, who authored Stanford and
4
upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to juveniles, asserted
in a footnote that the sentencing practices of other countries were not relevant in
42
deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty in this country. Thirteen years
43
later in Atkins, the Court was again forced to confront the constitutionality of the
death penalty, but this time, as applied to criminals with mental retardation
45
convicted of a capital crime. 4 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that
it was unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to criminals with mental
retardation.' In his opinion, Justice Stevens inserted a footnote citing to an amicus
brief by the European Union, which stated that "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved."47 Perhaps foreseeing the potential controversy in
using such a source, Justice Stevens asserted that the international norm was "by no
means dispositive ''48 and based his central holding on a national consensus

35. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
36. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
37. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
38. Without viewing the three cases successively, the title to this Part is somewhat misleading because
Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper are hardly pioneers, being that they were far from the first Supreme Court cases to
cite international norms. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Courtand
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practiceand the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision (2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=700176 (providing an expansive overview of the Supreme Court's citation
to foreign sources of law from the inception of the Court). Rather, the three cases are "pioneers" in the sense that
they are groundbreaking due to their revival and expansion of the Court's use of international authority in its
constitutional jurisprudence.
39. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
40. Id. at 380.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 369 n.l.
43. A central factor of the Court's shift in thinking can be directly attributed to the changing composition
of the Court. Between Stanford and Atkins, the Court saw four new faces: Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan
in 1990, Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall in 1991, Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice White in 1993, and
Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun in 1994. See GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at
xcvi-xcii (4th ed. 2001). It is of no small significance that three of the four new Justices (Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) favored the use of international norms in Lawrence and that Justice Kennedy has since shifted his position
on this issue. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
44. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
45. It should be noted that Justice Stevens also authored Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), a
juvenile death penalty case prior to Stanford that cited international authority. See id. at 830-31.
46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
47. Id. at 316 n.21.
48. Id.
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consisting of "the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges."'49 Although
he relegated his citation of the international authority to a footnote, it should not be
confused with a lack of significance. A quick peek into the Court's past opinions
illustrates that Justices tend to bury some of the most critical information in
footnotes.5 0 The point to take away from Atkins, however, is that Justice Stevens
reinstated the consideration of international authority into the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence. In the face of the Court's express disapproval of
this practice in Stanford, Justice Stevens' defiance in Atkins was indeed a
significant occurrence.
Two years after Atkins, the Court continued its practice of referencing foreign
sources of law in the death penalty context in Roper v. Simmons.5' In Roper, the
Court held that executing juveniles who were under eighteen years of age at the
time of their capital crime violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2
Notably, Roper devoted an entire section of the opinion (section IV) to the views
of other nations on the subject. 3 The Court prefaced the section with the following
words:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for
offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the task of
interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. Yet at least from
the time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of
other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments."'
Thus, while Atkins reasserted the views of other nations in the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, Roper entrenched that role for future generations. The
approach of Atkins, as compared to Roper, is also noteworthy. Whereas Atkins
contained the reference to international views in a footnote, Roper contained
numerous references to various international sources in its own section in the
opinion, perhaps indicative of its future role in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence.
Moreover, while Roper can more logically be seen as an extension of Atkins
because both involved the death penalty, it should not be forgotten that Roper came
after both Atkins and Lawrence. This may be most transparent in the Court's
seemingly preemptive defense of its assertion of international views. The Court,
perhaps sensing the mounting criticism of its use of international sources in Atkins
and Lawrence, defended its use of foreign sources in Roper. The Court stated:
49. Id. at 307.
50. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 n.1 1 (1954) (citing sociological and psychological
studies in support of the proposition that segregation had detrimental effects on black children); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (arguing for more judicial scrutiny of laws that affect "discrete
and insular minorities"). Justice Brennan's well-known "ratcheting" footnote effectively stated that Congress can
only expand and not contract our constitutional rights. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10.
51. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
52. Id. at 1200.
53. Id. at 1198-1200.
54. Id. at 1198.
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The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our conclusions .... Not the
least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is because we know it to be
our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights
by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same
rights within our own heritage of freedom.55
Some might construe the language in Roper as the Court being defensive because
it realizes it should not partake in such a practice. But, it might also be seen as a
sign that the Court is willing to maintain and defend its use of such a practice, in
spite of the mounting public criticism.
If Atkins and Roper were critical in reviving the Court's use of international
norms in the context of the death penalty, then Lawrence may possess even more
historical significance for expanding the application of foreign authority into areas
of the law where the Court had never before ventured. In Lawrence, the issue was
whether a Texas statute, criminalizing sexual conduct between two consenting
same-sex adults, was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 6 There, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,5 7 where a similar
statute from the state of Georgia was upheld in the face of a constitutional
challenge.5 8 Justice Kennedy cited to a case from the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) as persuasive authority in striking down the Texas law prohibiting
homosexual sodomy.59 The ECHR case Kennedy cited was Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 6° which involved a challenge to a Northern Ireland law that prohibited the
practice of consensual homosexual conduct. 6' The European Court struck down the
Northern Ireland law and held that it was invalid under the European Convention
on Human Rights.62 The importance of this citation to international authority in
Lawrence relates to its application and the extension of that application to a
different area of law.
Justice Kennedy's decision to cite the ECHR case opened the door for the Court
to apply international authority to a much broader range of cases, namely those
involving the right to privacy. In the past, the Court primarily sought and interjected
international authority only in the death penalty context.63 Lawrence changed this
by referencing a foreign authority for a case involving privacy. This was a
significant leap because the right to privacy has a reach that is both farther and
wider than situations involving the death penalty. For example, the right to privacy
incorporates "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1200.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 573.
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
See id.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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family relationships, child rearing, and education."' Thus, in terms of the Lawrence
decision, its legacy resides not merely in the area of gay rights, but also includes its
promotion of the use of international norms to influence other issues that touch
upon the everyday lives of individuals. By incorporating the case from the ECHR,
Lawrence paved the way for the Court to reference international sources of law in
future due process cases. It may have started a trend that the Court will expand
upon.
In summary, Atkins, Roper, and Lawrence offer significant hope for those who
advocate the use of international norms in the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. Atkins revived the practice after Stanford, Roper sustained it, and
Lawrence provided the prospect that the Court will extend the use of international
authority into other areas of the law, such as the right to privacy. Thus, if the Court
expands the role of international authority further in the next few years as Justice
O'Connor predicted,65 then historians will likely look back on the era of Atkins,
Roper, and Lawrence as a turning point in the Court's decision-making process.
While Atkins, Roper, and Lawrence may have set out increased expectations for
the use of international norms, there are concerns that fundamental democratic
principles are being sacrificed in the process. These concerns have been grouped
into three categories, otherwise known as the foundational arguments. The next Part
will discuss what critics consider to be the most pressing issues involving the use
of international norms.
1I. REINING IN ATKINS, ROPER, AND LAWRENCE: THE CRITICS AND
THE THREE FOUNDATIONAL ARGUMENTS
The Court's newfound attention to international sources of law in areas beyond
the traditional capital punishment arena has no shortage of critics who would like
to clamp down on this application before it becomes custom. 66 The reluctance to
embrace the use of foreign authority in purely domestic cases is based on a fear that
such a practice violates three of this nation's most cherished foundational
principles: separation of powers, federalism, and fairness of application. This Part
discusses the various arguments that critics have posed with respect to the three
principles, provides a response to each of them, and ultimately demonstrates the
concerns to be credible, but overstated.
A. Separationof Powers: Accusations of JudicialActivism
Perhaps no other doctrine epitomizes our democracy as well as that of separation
of powers. In The FederalistNo. 47, James Madison pronounced:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny .... In order
to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the

64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
65. See Rankin, supra note 24.
66. See BORK, supra note 29; Hargan, supranote 33; see also Mary Ann Glendon, JudicialTourism, WAML
ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14.
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sense in which the preservation of liberty requires, that the three great
departments of power should be separateand distinct.67

The application of international norms by the Supreme Court has triggered forceful
denunciations by critics who claim that the judiciary is infringing on this sacred
doctrine.68 The argument is that the Court's use of international authority usurps
legislative powers by taking a norm that has not been passed upon through the
democratic process and then forcing it upon our people.69 In his article, The
Sovereignty Implications of Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, Eric Hargan
argued that this is exactly what occurs in Atkins and Lawrence.70 Hargan criticized
the Supreme Court for applying international norms as if it were domestic law when
American voters had not passed upon these norms. 7' In other words, he accused the
Supreme Court of assuming the role of the legislature by taking an international
norm and making it the law of our land.
At the heart of his criticism is the fundamental notion that legislation cannot be
promulgated unless it is generated through the traditional democratic machinery.73
This process, which requires both bicameralism (passage by both Houses of
Congress) and presentment (signed by the President), is expressly laid out in Article
I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution 74 and has been described as a "finely wrought"
procedure designed by the Framers.75 Our domestic laws have been subject to both
bicameralism and presentment, while international laws (with the exception of
treaties and executive agreements) arise through a much different process and are
not the products of the "finely wrought" procedure that our Framers had in mind.76
Because "international law is not grounded upon as secure a positive law foundation
as is domestic law,"" when the judiciary applies international norms, "they are not
following the lead of the elected branches, but are striking out on their own., 7 1This
is threatening because the people are essentially being denied their voice in the
democratic process.
Every individual who has stepped foot in an elementary school classroom has
been inundated with the refrain that "the legislative branch makes laws, the
executive branch enforces laws, and the judicial branch interprets laws." Here,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
See Hargan, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
The relevant portion reads:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before
it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider
it.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
75. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440 (1998).
76. See Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts:A Modest Proposal,100 YALE L.J. 2277,
2309 (1991).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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when the judicial branch uses an international norm as an authority in its opinion,
critics accuse the courts of usurping the lawmaking powers of the legislative branch.
More precisely, the international norm becomes law without ever having been
secured through the political process.
The first defect with this assertion is the underlying assumption that when the
Court uses international norms to assist in the interpretation of the Constitution, it
is essentially adopting a foreign law. In Atkins, Roper, and Lawrence, the
international norms were used not as a dispositive factor but rather as additional
support only after domestic authority had been used. 79 In Atkins, the purpose of
referencing the European Union's amicus brief was not to say that the European
Union dictates whether or not it is constitutional to apply the death penalty to an
individual with mental retardation, but rather to support the notion that in the world
community, application of the death penalty to such individuals is considered "cruel
and unusual."8 One might argue whether it is necessary to mention the views of the
European Union, but it is not accurate to characterize such a move as "legislating."
Similarly, in Roper, the cataloguing of foreign sources on the subject was to
"provide respected and significant confirmation for [the Court's] conclusions,"8
not, as some might imply, to make the law based on international norms. As was the
case in Atkins, the reference to international sources did not come about until after
the Court carefully assessed the views of the state legislatures.8 2
Likewise, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy's citation of the ECHR case was not an
attempt to assert that the law, as shaped by that court, dictates our decisions. His
decision to reference the case was merely to note that in other parts of the world,
the right to privacy extends to homosexuals as well as heterosexuals.8 3 Hence, in
those cases, the Court did not make an end-run around the democratic lawmaking
process by adopting an international norm as if it were the law but, rather, simply
looked to the norm as another source of guidance while primarily relying on
domestic authority for the foundation of its opinion.
On a more basic level, and contrary to the allegations of judicial activism, 84 the
Supreme Court's use of international norms is rightly within the Court's authority
as the interpreter of the law. In other words, constitutional interpretation is not a
legislative function in the first instance. It has been established since Marbury v.
Madison85 that it is plainly within the ambit of the judiciary to declare the meaning
of the law. As Dean Harold Hongju Koh noted:

79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-72 (2003) (discussing a line of Supreme Court cases
upholding the right to privacy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (stating that the most reliable
objective factor in its analysis was the legislation enacted by state legislatures (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989)). In Roper, Justice Kennedy recognized that consensus among the U.S. state legislatures was the
starting, and most important, point for Eighth Amendment analysis. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,564 (2005)
("The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments
of legislatures that have addressed the question. This data gives us essential instruction.").
80. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
81. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
82. See id. at 560-67.
83. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
84. See, e.g., Jane Lampman, Bringingthe CaseAgainst Judges, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 13,2005,
at 15.
85. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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The Supreme Court clearly saw the judicial branch as the central channel for
making international law part of U.S. law. For when "there is no written law
upon the subject," Justice Gray directed, "the duty still rests upon the judicial
tribunals of ascertainingand declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes

necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly
brought before them." That language strongly recalls cadences in Marbury v.
Madison's command that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," a directive that nowhere limited the

judiciary's law-declaring function to cases involving domestic law.86

Dean Koh's argument thus ties the Court's right to recognize international norms
to its most fundamental power, that is, to declare what the law is. It should be clear
then that the Court can reference international norms when the Court deems it
necessary to interpret the law.
There is a sense that Marbury and the doctrine of judicial review can be used as
a catch-all to rationalize every interpretive method that the Supreme Court employs.
For example, let us assume that the Court decided to use (suspending disbelief for
a second) fortunes from fortune cookies to assist in the interpretation of the
Constitution. It seems as if the Court could simply defend this absurd practice by
claiming that it is within its power to declare what the law is, and if using the
fortunes from fortune cookies is a useful aid, it should be a permissible practice.
The problem with the judicial activism argument is that it is more of an attack on
judicial review than it is on the practice of using international norms.
The Court has always exercised broad discretion in its interpretation of the
Constitution. 7 Where the text of the Constitution is vague, we defer to the Court's
expertise on the subject matter. Simply because the Court has wide discretion to
interpret the Constitution does not mean that the Court will necessarily abuse that
power. As Professor Cass Sunstein observed, "If the words of the Constitution do
not resolve hard constitutional cases, it seems undeniable that people who interpret
the document have to look to something other than those words in order to do their
jobs."8 8 In doing so, wrote Professor Levinson, "[o]ne might well say that a clearly
expressed 'local norm' ought to trump an international norm, but if we view the
relevant constitutional text as quite indeterminate, then why should judges not look
to other courts to see how they confronted similar issues?"89 The assertion that we
should limit the Court's ability to look outside our country's borders is to doubt the
Court's judgment on how it should go about declaring what the law is. We should
be wary of making such an assertion absent evidence that the Court is exhibiting
clear disregard for the Constitution.

86. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Repect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1085, 1090-91 (2002) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) and Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 177) (footnotes omitted).
87. See, e.g., Marbury,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
88. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrrIUTION 94 (1993). But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, in Symposium,
supra note 20, at 43, 45 (arguing that Lawrence should have struck down the Texas sodomy statute on narrower
grounds, avoiding the use of both emerging social values and judgments of other nations).
89. Levinson, in Symposium, supranote 20, at 37, 39.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36

It is true that the Court often appears to have too much power with its ability to
render an act of Congress or a state law invalid. 9° This, however, is one of the
consequences of the doctrine of separation of powers, which allows for a system of
checks and balances. As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson,9
A system of separate and coordinate powers necessarily involves an acceptance
of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused. As we reiterate this very
day, "[ilt is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." While the
separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in
order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.'
Although Justice Scalia was writing about the need for a strong executive branch
in Morrison,the same might be said for a strong judiciary. It is the strength of each
branch that keeps the other branches in check.
In summation, the criticism that the use of international norms violates the
separation of powers doctrine has not been substantiated with any empirical
evidence. In Atkins, Roper, and Lawrence, the reliance on international authority
only came about after Justices Stevens and Kennedy supported their holdings with
domestic authority.93 Furthermore, the use of international norms in helping
interpret the Constitution is within the power of the Court to declare the meaning
of the law, and if those norms provide some additional insight on a vague subject,
then allowing them to be used as persuasive authority would not contravene any
separation of powers principles. Separation of powers is a sacred doctrine, one
which lies at the core of this nation's governmental system. Any charges that it is
being violated will always be of great concern. Here, however, the apprehension
that the Court's practice of looking abroad will result in a seizure of legislative
lawmaking powers is largely overstated.
B. Federalism:Infringing on State Police Power?
The federal system under which our nation operates is a unique governmental
system. Rather than have an all-encompassing federal government, we have a
country of fifty subunits, each with the power to pass its own laws. To quote
recently retired Justice O'Connor, federalism "assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society."'94 Thus,
the purpose behind allowing each state government to pass its own laws is to insure
that each state may accommodate and meet the specific needs of its constituents.95
To expect the federal government to address the particularized needs of each state
90. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Understandingthe Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to Professor
Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 663 (2003) (describing the Rehnquist Court as having two phases, with the
subsequent one showing little deference to the elected branches of government). But see Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Limited Path Dependency of Precedent,7 U. PA. J. CONST.L. 903,987-88 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court
has overturned federal and state laws very infrequently throughout its history).
91. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
92. Id. at 710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)) (citation
omitted).
93. See supra note 79.
94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
95. See also New State lce Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing
individual states passing laws and serving as a laboratory to try social and economic experiments).
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would be too arduous a task for even the most efficient federal government because
it has the enormous responsibility of overseeing the welfare of the entire nation.
Therefore, federalism, which asks that state and local governments take on the
details, is a system that provides a lot of responsibility to our communities. The
introduction of international norms in the federalism context causes problems
precisely because international norms are not attuned to local needs. This leads to
a potential conflict with a state's police powers.
The proper starting point for any federalism discussion must be the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which states: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people."" Thus, states are generally recognized as
having the authority to regulate the everyday affairs of their constituents, such as
safety and local law enforcement.97 As the Court stated in United States v.
Morrison,9 8 "the principle that 'the Constitution created a Federal Government of
limited powers,' while reserving a generalized police power to the States is deeply
ingrained in our constitutional history."99 Those who condemn the Supreme Court's
practice of using foreign authority assert that, in cases like Atkins, Roper, and
Lawrence, state legislatures have already passed laws pursuant to their generalized
police power." Hence, the argument continues, the Court is violating fundamental
principles of federalism by utilizing international norms not passed upon by the
state legislatures to strike down those statutes.'0° The Court, critics argue, has no
right to impose an international norm upon the people when the governing authority
clearly belongs to the states.0 2
For states' rights supporters, the use of foreign norms is especially galling
because of the absolute disconnect between general international norms and specific
local interests. Judge Bork proclaimed that it is "liberalism's tendency to search for
the universal and to denigrate the particular."'0 3 More simply, representatives of
state legislatures were arguably voted upon to represent their own constituents, and,
thus, the laws they passed should govern-not some generalized international norm
or the result of a foreign case.'O
There is, however, a crucial distinction that must be made regarding the cases in
which the Supreme Court has recognized international norms. It is undeniably true
that states can regulate law enforcement stemming from their generalized police
powers.0 5 This, however, does not grant them the right to pass laws that conflict
with the fundamental rights of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution.'0 6 In

96. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
97. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (supporting the proposition that there is no
better example of state police power than the regulation of violent crime).
98. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
99. Id. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)).
100. Hargan, supra note 33.
101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. BORK, supra note 29, at 22.
104. Hargan, supra note 33.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (explaining that states have the power
to suppress violent crime and to vindicate victims).
106. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("'If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul
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Atkins, for example, the Court sought to determine whether sentencing an individual
with mental retardation to death was a violation of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.0 7 The Court drew upon international
authority not as a substitute for the local law, but to assist in the determination of
whether the local law itself was constitutional.' To say that the Court substituted
international opinion for local law is to overstate the value that the Court has placed
on the foreign authority. Though it is difficult to discern just how much weight the
Court assigned to each of their authorities, it is safe to assert that international
authority was not the sole and primary basis for the Court's holdings in Atkins,
Roper, and Lawrence. As mentioned before, those cases used domestic sources as
primary authority.'°9 As a result, the federalism argument collapses if (1) the local
or state norm is constitutionally impermissible on domestic grounds, and (2) the
international norm is a consideration but not a primary basis for overruling the local
norm.
Even if one recognizes that the Supreme Court has a right to use international
norms in itsjurisprudence, there is still a sense of dissatisfaction for those who have
concerns with the Court using foreign sources of law. Much of this discontent
derives from the realization that if the Court can use international norms at its
discretion, then there appears to be no boundaries to circumscribe the Court's power
to use them arbitrarily and to strike down domestic laws at its whim. The next Part
discusses this remaining, underlying fear of those who criticize the practice of citing
to foreign norms.
C. Fairnessof Application
1. Mistrust of the Court
Of the three branches, the judiciary was always thought to be the least
threatening to the ideals of democracy. The familiar passage by Alexander Hamilton
in The FederalistNo. 78 stated:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive,
that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them ....
[T]he judiciary.. .has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can
take no active resolution whatever.
It may truly be said to have neither Force nor
0
Will, but merely judgment. 11

the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the
constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery....'" (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136
(1809))).
107. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
108. See id. at 311-12.
109. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
110. JOHN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 45 (1980) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander

Hamilton)).
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These days, the mere "judgment" that Hamilton speaks of performs a critical role
in the way this nation functions."' Many believe today not that the Court is weak,
but rather that it has too much power and often reaches beyond what the
Constitution would permit when deciding its cases." 2 It has become no less than a
national pastime to accuse the Court of being activist, and its decision to increase
the use of international norms has only served to intensify those accusations." 3
Aside from separation of powers and federalism concerns, the most common
critique relates to the fairness of application, or the application of foreign authority
in a consistent fashion." 4 It has been argued that if the Court is to reference or rely
on foreign authorities, then it should do so in a consistent and logical manner that
is in harmony with the principles of stare decisis." The underlying fear is that the
use of international norms is not a structured discipline, and, thus, the Court has too
much power and discretion to arbitrarily select a foreign authority to support its
holding." 6 Critics such as Hargan argue that the Court "has made no effort to
delineate 'good' and 'bad' foreign authorities, to differentiate among the various
sources it considers binding," and has never explained why certain authorities such
as the European Union or the ECHR are ultimately used rather than an authority
from China or a Chinese court of law.'
To begin with, the Supreme Court does not have to differentiate between
international authorities that are binding rather than persuasive. I do not propose,
nor do I believe the Court would propose, a practice of citing international norms
as binding authority." 8 On the other hand, the Court's choice of international
authorities in crafting a particular decision should be explained and defended. After
all, there should be some rational basis for the cases and norms that it cites. In
Atkins, for example, the majority opinion cites an amicus brief from the European
Union, stating that "within the world community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved."" 9 Hargan is troubled by this selection because he believes that the
European Union is no more representative of the "world community" than the
United States. 2 ° Thus, he argues, the European Union should not be used "as a

11. See id.
112. See, e.g., Symposium, supranote 20, at 25.
113. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 29, at 15-25; see also Donald Lambro, DeLay Slams Court Activism as
"Autocracy",WASH. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A4 (discussing U.S. Representative Tom DeLay's argument that
there has been a movement of judicial activism by the courts, including the Supreme Court).
114. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the majority
cited foreign law, it ignored "the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy").
115. See Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign
PersuasiveAuthority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357 (2005).
116. For example, U.S. Representative Tom Feeney asked, "[H]ow is a judge, if [comparative analysis] is
an appropriate process, to discern which of the countries is appropriate to cite and which of the countries is notT'
Id. at 359 (quoting Appropriate Roleof Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R.
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (2004)).
117. Hargan, supra note 33.
118. Accord Davis, supra note 23 (arguing that courts should not cite international norms as controlling
authority but that it may sometimes be appropriate).
119. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
120. Hargan, supra note 33.
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proxy for the world community, without [the Court] ever explaining how the EU
obtained that authority."''
In one respect, Hargan is correct when he claims that the United States is as
much a representative of the "world community" as the European Union.
Nevertheless, this point has little relevance since the Justices in Atkins were already
considering the consensus of the state legislatures to be the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."' 22 That the foreign authority
was consistent with the consensus of the state legislatures provided only additional
support for Justice Stevens' majority opinion, which, consequently, resulted in a
stronger, more forceful opinion.'23 In other words, the Court was not considering
either the consensus within the United States or the consensus outside of the United
States. Rather, it was considering the international consensus in addition to the
consensus within the United States. It is absolutely critical to acknowledge that, in
deciding this case, the Court placed primary weight on domestic authority.
Second, the Court did not proffer the EU brief as a proxy for the opinion of the
world community. Justice Stevens writes that "within the world community"
executing criminals with mental retardation is disapproved. 24
' More to the point, the
Court chose the European Union to represent one opinion from the world
community (albeit an important one), not the opinion of the entire world
community. This is a crucial distinction because it demonstrates that Justice Stevens
cites to the European Union not to deceive the audience into thinking that the world
is unanimous on this issue, but because an important segment of the world
community is opposed to the practice of executing individuals with mental
retardation. Of course, Justice Stevens could have forged a consensus that involved
a larger segment of the world community, but this still does not negate the fact that
the European Union is a logical international authority to reference, given that it
consists of a group of democratic European countries, 125 some of which provided
the foundational principles for our own democracy. The parallel experiences
resulting from a shared democratic governing structure make the European Union
a more rational international norm to reference than other countries that may not
share the same form or principles of governance. States often look to other states
because those other states share similar constructs of government.126 The Supreme
Court is merely doing the same on a larger scale. The idea is that other nations, such
as those in the European Union, face similar issues because of the way their
countries are governed. Thus, it is beneficial to see how those other countries deal
with familiar problems in a comparable contextual setting.'21

121. Id.
122. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
123. Id. at 316 n.2 1.However, one may debate the merits of whether the state legislatures had really reached
a consensus on prohibiting the use of the death penalty against the individuals with mental retardation. See id. at
341-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 316 n.21 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
125. See EUROPA, Panorama of the European Union, http://europa.eu.intlabc/panorama/index-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2006) (describing the European Union as "a family of democratic European countries").
126. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
127. In Roper, while Justice Kennedy does not cite to the European Union, he does cite to those countries
that have ratified Article 37 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
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In Atkins, the use of international norms could be explained by the Court's search
for a consensus both inside and outside the country. In Lawrence, however, Justice
Kennedy supplied his own explanation for his use of the ECHR case. In the first
instance, the case was referenced because of its similarities to Bowers v.
Hardwick128 and Lawrence on its facts. 29 Like Bowers and Lawrence, the ECHR
case was about a man who was prohibited by his jurisdiction from engaging in
homosexual conduct. 130 Moreover, Justice Kennedy provided another reason for
citing the ECHR case when he stated that the ECHR is "[a]uthoritative in all
countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations
now)." '' The use of a case from a court that covers multiple jurisdictions was
logical for a controversial case like Lawrence, particularly because the Supreme
Court exercises jurisdiction over a union of states, which, in many instances,
operate as if they were independent nations. 132 Thus, a case from the ECHR
provides greater persuasive value precisely because a large number of countries
follow its decisions.
It is true, however, that the Court has not yet developed a structure for
determining whether certain international norms are more persuasive than others.
Should a case from the ECHR be more persuasive than a similar case from a court
in an Asian, African, or South American country? There is certainly an arbitrary
quality to the selection of international authorities, but I would argue that much of
this has to do with the fact that the practice of referencing international norms is
still in its nascent stages. Though the Court has long cited international norms,' 33
it has not done so prevalently. 34 In addition, there is no constraint on dissenting
Justices who might wish to reference conflicting international norms for the purpose
of open debate. Thus, if there is a case from an Asian, African, or South American
country that addresses the same issue, there is no reason that it could not be used
to counter the ECHR.
Moreover, the argument against the practice of drawing upon international
authority because of the arbitrariness of application is overstated since the
authorities themselves are not binding. When Justices look abroad, they are not
looking for an international norm or case that provides a definitive answer that they
can follow. Rather, the purpose of their search is to observe how other nations
resolve similar issues under similar circumstances. For example, in his dissent in
Printz v. United States, 135 Justice Breyer offered vital insight as to why the Court
has looked to international norms: "Of course, we are interpreting our own
Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and
576 (2005). Although not all countries within this group have similar governing structures, it nevertheless involves
entities that have entered a common international pact.
128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 95.
133. See supra note 5 (describing use of international norms in death penalty cases).
134. See Davis, supranote 23, at 419 ("'The same readiness to look beyond one's own shores has not marked
the decisions of the court on which I serve."' (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative
Action: An InternationalHuman Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L REV. 253, 282 (1999))).
135. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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structural differences between their systems and our own. But their experience may
nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem."' 36
Therefore, when the Court cites to an international norm, it is looking for insight,
not a panacea. Accordingly, it should matter little whether the international
authority comes from the Privy Council of Jamaica, the Supreme Court of India, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of Canada, "' or the ECHR.138 As
long as the authority is relegated to its role as a helpful guide and not as the sole,
binding authority, the use of international norms is no different than when Justices
cite to other outside sources. Professor Sanford Levinson argues:
After all, state courts within the United States often look to other state
courts-not because a California court believes itself obligated to follow New
York law but rather because a properly humble judge finds it useful to see what
colleagues elsewhere have done. Similarly, no one suggests that the views of the
European courts should be controlling, only that they provide potential insight.
We might take a leaf here from the emphasis in The Federaliston "experience"
as a guide, and from James Madison's own emphasis in his writings on
comparative government. Publius would undoubtedly have found it unbearably
parochial to be told that we in the United States can learn nothing from the
experience of other countries. So should we.' 39
Professor Levinson's comparison highlights precisely why the fairness of
application argument is overstated. First, the Supreme Court's practice of looking
beyond this nation's boundaries is not unlike a state court looking to another state's
jurisprudence for guidance. It is nothing more than an attempt to look at what others
in similar situations have done. Thus, California may look to New York rather than
Ohio, not because New York's authority is more representative of California's
views, but because Ohio may not have confronted the issue or, similarly, may not
have heard a case with a factual basis that parallels the case under review in
California. The same logic applies here. Justice Kennedy's decision to choose a
case from the ECHR rather than a case from another country's court can certainly
be attributed to other countries not having confronted the issue as squarely or as
recently as the ECHR.
In addition, the Court's practice of looking abroad is more indicative of a humble
approach to adjudicating its cases than that of a Court that will stop at nothing to
justify its conclusions." 4 That the Court is willing to seek outside perspectives to

136. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
137. See BORK, supra note 29, at 23 (arguing against Justice Breyer's dissent in the denial of certiorari to
Knight v. Florida,528 U.S. 990 (1999)); see also Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to
cases from the Privy Council of Jamaica, the Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe).
138. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing cases
from the Supreme Court of Canada and the ECHR to argue that "other constitutional courts facing similarly
complex constitutional problems" have taken a comparable approach in upholding campaign finance laws against
a First Amendment challenge).
139. Levinson, in Symposium, supra note 20, at 37, 39.
140. Of course the converse is not necessarily true. A court that does not cite international or foreign sources
may not believe that the foreign sources shed light on the case. The point here is that looking to international
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improve its decision making process is an expression of tolerance. Professor
Levinson's position is that "[n]o one.. .should believe that.. .jurisdictional
4t
limitations would still the often bitter debates about constitutional interpretation."'
In his view, the "Constitution is full of what Robert Jackson termed 'majestic
2
generalities,' and it is quixotic to expect a consensus on their meaning."' Thus, he
argues that the best method of guarding against judicial activism is to allow them
to have a "greater diversity of judicial perspectives."' 43
In short, the arbitrariness of application is not a grave concern when one takes
into account that the international norm is not being relied on as the sole binding
authority but, rather, as one instrument of persuasive value. The next section briefly
discusses the most appropriate instances in which to reference foreign norms.
Certain types of cases benefit more than others from the use of international norms,
and, as a starting point, the Court should look to increase their use of foreign
authority in these areas of the law.
2. When International Norms Should Be Applied
The question of when international authority should be sought out is also a
possible subject of criticism.' One can argue that the Court should at least be
consistent as to when international norms will apply in the adjudication of its cases.
For example, why were international norms cited for Atkins and Lawrence but not
in any of the seventy-plus cases in their respective terms? I propose that the Court
look to international authority when the relevant constitutional language is vague
and undetermined. Justice Blackmun was a staunch proponent of this practice,
suggesting that "[i]nternational law can and should inform the interpretation of
various clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
45
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments."' That statement,
made in 1994, seems prophetic, especially in light of the Lawrence decision.
International norms had already been a mainstay in the Eighth Amendment
context,' 46 but its application in the Due Process context was a novel development
at the time of the Lawrence decision.
It is in the constitutionally vague areas that international authority has the
potential for the most benefit. Part of the reason is that the interpretation of
constitutionally vague clauses often requires finding a consensus. The benefit of
having a consensus that includes the standards and norms of other nations is more
compelling than a mere consensus amongst the states. Justice Blackmun argued that
it is not simply a good idea for the Court to look abroad; rather, he indicates that the
Court is obligated to look abroad when interpreting certain clauses, such as the

sources of law is not result-oriented. Rather, it is an attempt to look to any source that may be of assistance and
recognizing that source.
141. Levinson, in Symposium, supra note 20, at 37, 39.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. For an example of a framework used in deciding which international norms should be applied, see
generally Glensy, supra note 115, at 401-40.
145. See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1994).
146. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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"cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.'4 7 Justice
Blackmun said:
Refusing to consider international practice in construing the Eighth Amendment
is convenient for a Court that wishes to avoid conflict between the death penalty
and the Constitution. But it is not consistent with this Court's established
construction of the Eighth Amendment. If the substance of the Eighth
Amendment is to turn on the "evolving standards of decency" of the civilized
world, there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions
of the United States.148
Although there have been criticisms launched at using a consensus approach to
interpret the Constitution,149 it is the settled method of adjudication for certain areas
of law, such as application of the Eighth Amendment. 150 Consequently, insofar as
consensus is required, the use of international norms is an ideal fit because a
consensus that consists of both this country and other members of the world
community is more persuasive than a consensus that only consists of the states. This
is not to say that the consensus of the international community should trump a
consensus within this country if there is ever a conflict. There is little question that
a consensus formed from the states is more significant.'' However, the international
community is also an important voice that should be considered as a factor when
there is no clear consensus from within this country. It is at ambiguous times when
looking to international norms can be of great benefit.
Because of the Supreme Court's influence over this nation's constituents, it is
natural to be skeptical of the Court's interpretive tools. Like other methods of
interpretation,' 52 the practice of using international norms is subject to unfairness
or arbitrariness of application. This criticism, however, is exaggerated because of
the reasons outlined above. Contrary to the critics' assumption that the Court would
be limitless in its power to apply international legal norms,' 53 there are forces that
constrain the Court from arbitrarily choosing any foreign authority to support its
propositions. The practice of looking abroad to see how others have resolved similar
issues is cabined by both factual and contextual restrictions and may not even apply
unless the Constitution is sufficiently vague on the subject. 14 Therefore, the fear of
arbitrary application is largely overstated because the value of insight that an
international norm can provide will reach only as far as the parallels that can be
147. See Blackmun, supra note 145, at 48.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 110, at 63-69.
150. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,560-64 (2005) (describing Eighth Amendment analysis and
using the consensus approach based on the "evolving standards of decency").
151. "The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particularby the
enactmentsof legislaturesthat have addressed the question... We then must determine, in the exercise of our own
independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles." Id. at 1192
(emphasis added).
152. See ELY, supra note 110 (describing and critiquing various methods of interpretation).
153. See BORK, supranote 29, at 22-24 (alleging an abuse of power in the Supreme Court's citing to foreign
sources).
154. For example, Lawrence was cabined by the facts of its case-the criminality of homosexual
sodomy-and the case cited from the ECHR specifically dealt with similar facts. See supra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text.
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drawn from the norm. Ultimately, the Court would not choose to cite arbitrary
international norms because it would be undercutting the very reason for using that
authority in the first place.
1II. BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL: OTHER PURPOSES FOR
USING INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The principal rationale tendered for incorporating international norms into our
constitutional jurisprudence is that it provides insight into how others have resolved
common legal problems. 55 A good argument can be made, however, that the risks
of this practice, in terms of the possibility that it may violate principles of
separation of powers, federalism, and fairness of application, render it a perilous
' Do the positive factors of looking beyond our shores really outweigh
undertaking. 56
the negative factors? Are there additional reasons for using international law,
besides the fact that it may sometimes be "helpful"? The reality that this practice
provides potential insight might be enough to justify its application by the Court,
but it may not be satisfying to those critics who see the negative factors as a
collective ax chipping away at the underpinnings of the Constitution. This Part
seeks to expound on additional arguments that support the Court's use of
international norms in its adjudicative process.
One argument that has been proffered to support the practice of incorporating
Court.157
international law is that it strengthens the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme
The Court has traditionally been looked upon by other nations as a leading legal
institution, and, thus, its jurisprudence has performed an instrumental role in the
governance of other nations.'58 For example, the Indian Constitution of 1850 was
written in language that reflects the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. 5 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has frequently looked to
thejurisprudence of its U.S. counterpart when interpreting its own Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Canada's version of the Bill of Rights).' 6°
In the past few years, however, the Rehnquist Court was criticized by the
61
judiciaries of other nations for isolating itself from foreign legal authorities.'
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 of the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the

155. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. See supra Part I.
157. See Davis, supra note 23, at 421 (arguing that as a result of globalization, the legitimacy of U.S. courts
depends on their willingness to incorporate international legal norms).
158. See Claire L'Heureux-Dub, The Importanceof Dialogue:Globalization and the InternationalImpact
of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 18-22 (1998).
159. See id. at 18.
160. Id. at 19.
161. See id. at 37-40; see also BORK, supranote 29, at 24-25. In particular, Justice L'Heureux-Dub stated:
In my opinion, the failure of the United States Supreme Court to take part in the international
dialogue among the courts of the world, particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to
a growing isolation and diminished influence. The U.S. Supreme Court has failed to look with
any regularity outside the borders of the United States for sources of inspiration. In my view this
tendency to look inward may well make the judgments of U.S. courts increasingly less relevant
internationally.
L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 158, at 37.
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declining influence of the Rehnquist Court internationally 62 and stated that the
Court has chosen not to participate in this international "dialogue.' ' 63 When the
Justices of the Supreme Court traveled abroad in 2000 to an American Bar
Association conference in London, they were criticized for not taking heed of
foreign authorities. 16" Judge Bork wrote of a prominent London barrister who
accused the U.S. Supreme Court of "turning its back on the Continent" and
denounced the United States as being "quite certain it has nothing much to learn
165
from us.'

In response to these criticisms, professor Martha Davis argued that the Court
must pay more attention to international norms as a way to maintain its status as a
leading legal institution and to ensure that its legitimacy is not undermined.' 66 Davis
asserted that "[g]lobalization has now so pervaded our national culture and
identities that a court that consistently ignores international precedents and
experiences when considering human rights issues, even if merely for their
persuasive or moral weight, risks irrelevancy."'' 67 The legitimacy argument reflects
Justice O'Connor's sentiment that the Court should increase its reliance on
international norms to "create that all important good impression."'' 68
This line of reasoning is nonetheless subject to the criticisms that the Court
should only be concerned with its proper role within the United States. Critics
suggest, for example, that making a good impression internationally should not be
an objective on the Court's checklist because it compromises the Court's primary
duty of loyalty to the constituents of this nation. 169 To appease the international
judiciaries by taking part in this international dialogue would be nothing more than
self-aggrandizement, a self-serving quest for respect.
These criticisms, however, fail to account for the "melting pot" that makes up our
nation. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, almost half of all Americans will
consist of minorities by the year 2050.1"° Furthermore, as of 1999, nearly ten
percent of the U.S. population was foreign-born.' 7 ' The ties that American
constituents have with other nations and cultures provide a strong endorsement for
a constitutional jurisprudence that is in step with international norms. Looking to
authorities from abroad is not just placating the desires of foreign judiciaries, it is
also reaffirming to our own constituents that the Supreme Court does not adjudicate
cases in a vacuum.
To be clear, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 is not advocating that the U.S. Supreme
Court "change its constitutional interpretations to accord with decisions anywhere

162. L'Heureux-Dub, supra note 158, at 27.
163. Id. at 37.
164. See BORK, supra note 29, at 24.
165. Id. These criticisms, however, have not been as prevalent as they have previously been, perhaps because
of the Court's recent citations to international sources.
166. Davis, supra note 23, at 421.
167. Id.
168. Rankin, supra note 24.
169. See Hargan, supra note 33.
170. Davis, supra note 23, at 425.
171. Id.
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else in the world."' 72 Nor should it abandon "the doctrines and approaches particular
to American constitutional law."' 7 3 But, she believes that "considering and
comparing judgments from various jurisdictions makes for stronger, more
considered decisions, even if the result is the same" and that "[floreign comparison
broadens the perspectives for decision-making."' 74 In other words, the Court's
opinions will be less prone to attacks on its legitimacy because it will have looked
at the problem from multiple perspectives.
By taking into account foreign norms, the Court maintains some semblance of
credibility in the face of increasing globalization. At the very least, this practice will
convey a different perspective and, at most, may very well provide luminous
insight.
The Court should also extend its treatment of international norms into its
constitutional jurisprudence out of a "decent respect for the opinions of
mankind."' 75 This argument, which is essentially a subset of the legitimacy
argument, has been promoted by Justice Blackmun,'7 6 Professor Louis Henkin,' 77
and Dean Koh. 78 As a fledgling nation, the United States felt an obligation to look
outside its borders because the colonies wanted to be viewed as more than just
property by their peers. 17' Because the United States did not have a legal system of
its own at the time, "the Framers necessarily looked to the Law of Nations, which
had a concrete and well-understood meaning in the courts of the American
colonies."' 80 In effect, the independent colonies needed to establish their collective
credibility as an independent sovereign by gaining the respect of other nations.
Because obeying the law of nations was a direct route to obtaining that credibility,
"the law of nations became part of the common law of the United States."''8 The
United States should not disregard international authority now that it no longer
needs to establish its credibility as an independent nation. Such disloyalty to
international authority chips away at the integrity of our judicial system. Although
the independent judiciary should maintain its distance from foreign and political
affairs, a U.S. Supreme Court that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of other nations
necessarily undercuts the legitimacy of the other branches of government.
These arguments, which are not functional in nature, provide additional reasons
for the Court to incorporate international norms into its jurisprudence. Although the
legitimacy argument can be criticized as being political in nature, it is vital that the
Supreme Court, which is seen as the enduring symbol of American justice, not be
seen as parochial. This is a nation that has often been portrayed as the paragon of
democracy and the leader in human rights reform. However, this enduring vision
that other nations equate with America may slowly deteriorate as others see the
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United States fall behind on certain human rights' issues. Dean Koh of Yale Law
School stated that "[hiuman rights progress is not the same in every part of the
world at the same time .... In the U.S., we're ahead on some issues, but behind on
others, such as the death penalty, gay rights and immigrants' rights."' 82 By looking
at international sources and using them when appropriate, the Supreme Court
signals a willingness to remain a leader on all issues and thus preserves its image
as the preeminent advocate for human rights. 83
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the new Roberts Court will actually increase the role of
international norms in its constitutional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
enunciated, even in early cases such as The PaqueteHabana,'" that "[i]nternational
law is part of our law."'8 5 Accordingly, the Justices of the Court can and should
look beyond the boundaries of this nation when adjudicating its cases. In fact, the
Court's recent opinions in Atkins v. Virginia,'8 6 Lawrence v. Texas, 187 and Roper v.
Simmons'88 indicate that this Court is prepared to thrust international authority into
a larger spotlight, although holdovers, such as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
seek to prevent this practice from becoming custom." 9 Even without a consensus,
it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court is ready to increase its part in this
international dialogue and to carve a new niche for international norms into its
constitutional jurisprudence.' 90
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